We assume that Eve and Bob are connected to Alice with additive white Gaussian noise, and their noises are correlated. We mathematically formulate the correlation between their noises, and optimize Eve's strategy. We give a necessarily and sufficient condition to generate the agreed secure key between Alice and Bob even with the Eve's optimal strategy. Further, in this setting, we give a concrete protocol to generate secure final keys whose leaked information is rigorously and quantitatively guaranteed even with finite block-length code. Further, we prepare solutions for two possible attacks by Eve. [20] is considered as a typical model for physical layer security. In the wire-tap channel model, the authorized sender, Alice is willing to transmit her message to the authorized receiver, Bob without any information leakage to the adversary, Eve. In this case, we usually assume that the noise in the channel to Eve is larger than that in the channel to Bob. However, it is not easy to guarantee this assumption under the real wireless communication. In cryptography, it is usual to consider that the adversary, Eve is more powerful than the authorized users, Alice and Bob in some sense [21] . However, the above wire-tap channel requires the opposite assumption. So, it does not have sufficient powers of conviction to assume the above wire-tap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, secure wireless communication attracts much attention as a practical method to realize physical layer security [23] , [28] , [22] , [29] , [15] , [16] , [17] . In particular, wire-tap channel model [9] , [10] , [11] , [20] is considered as a typical model for physical layer security. In the wire-tap channel model, the authorized sender, Alice is willing to transmit her message to the authorized receiver, Bob without any information leakage to the adversary, Eve. In this case, we usually assume that the noise in the channel to Eve is larger than that in the channel to Bob. However, it is not easy to guarantee this assumption under the real wireless communication. In cryptography, it is usual to consider that the adversary, Eve is more powerful than the authorized users, Alice and Bob in some sense [21] . However, the above wire-tap channel requires the opposite assumption. So, it does not have sufficient powers of conviction to assume the above wire-tap channel.
In stead of wire-tap channel model, we often employ secure key agreement, in which, Alice and Bob generate the agreed secure key from their own correlated random variables [3] , [4] . This problem has a similar problem because to generate one-way communication from Alice to Bob, they need to assume that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is larger than that between Alice and Eve. Further, although there exist proposals to experimentally generate secure key from wireless communication [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , they do not give any quantitative and rigorous security evaluation for the final keys under a reasonable assumption that is advantageous to Eve. Hence, for practical realization of secure wireless communication, it is needed to give a method satisfying the following conditions.
(1) The assumption is physically reasonable, and allows Eve to have several choices. (2) The security of final keys is guaranteed quantitatively and rigorously even though Eve takes the optimal strategy under the above assumption. Additionally, the formula to derive the security evaluation has sufficiently small calculation complexity. (3) The calculation complexity of the whole protocol is sufficiently small. In particular, no continuous variable is transmitted via public communication. One might consider that we need a useful formula for the evaluation of the correctness of final keys. However, since the correctness can be checked by random sampling of the generated keys, this requirement M. Hayashi is with Graduate School of Mathematics, Nagoya University, Furocho, Chikusaku, Nagoya, 464-8602, Japan, and Centre for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, 3 Science Drive 2, Singapore 117542. (e-mail: masahito@math.nagoya-u.ac.jp)
is not necessarily. Since the security cannot be evaluated directly from the random sampling final keys, we need its theoretical formula as the above.
In wireless communication, the input signal is given as a continuous random variable X 1 and we often assume that the output random variable of Bob is given as √ a B X 1 + √ d B Y by using the additive normalized white noise Y , i.e., the random variable Y is subject to normalized Gaussian distribution with average 0 [22] . Similarly, the output random variable of Eve is given as √ d E Z into two parts, the noise Z 1 generated during the transmission between Alice's device and Eve's device and the noise Z 2 generated during the detection in the Eve's measuring device. Then, we can consider that the noise Z 1 is correlated to the same part of Bob's noise √ d B Y . However, it is not easy to estimate the amount of this correlation exactly. To guarantee the security, we consider an assumption that is very advantageous to Eve. That is, we assume that Eve detects the signal on the line between Alice and Bob, and we divide the Bob's noise to three parts, the noise Y 1 generated during the transmission between Alice's device and Eve's point, the noise Y 2 generated during the transmission between Eve's point and Bob's device, and the noise Y 3 generated during the detection in the Bob's measuring device, as Fig. 1 . Then, we assume that the noise Z 1 is proportional to the noise Y 1 and other noises are independent of each other. In this case, Bob performs reverse reconciliation by using the wireless communication with error correction. Since this communication might be tapped by Eve, it can be regarded as a public communication with no error.
In this paper, we mathematically formulate this assumption, and clarify the requirement to generate secure key under this model, in our model of secure wireless communication. Further, under this requirement, combining existing results with finite block-length analysis [5] , [6] , [18] , [14] , we give a concrete method to generate a secure key whose leaked information can be quantitatively guaranteed. This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the mathematical formulation for our model, and optimize Eve's strategy. Then, we derive the maximum of the information leaked to Eve as the main theorems. Section III derives efficient protocol to generate secure keys whose security is rigorously and quantitatively guaranteed. Section IV discusses two Eve's attacks in our model. One is increasing the number of Eve's antennas and the other is Eve's controlling Bob's noise. In this section, we give their solutions. Section V is devoted for the proofs of the main theorems and several important statements. In Section VI, we discuss the relations between our result and related topics.
II. FORMULATION Now, we give a formulation with reverse reconciliation. We assume that Alice generates the signal X 1 subject to the standard Gaussian distribution in the initial transmission from Alice to Bob. Then, we we assume that Bob receives the signal
where Y is a random variable subject to the standard Gaussian distribution independently of X 1 . The constant a B is the intensity of the signal when Bob receives and the constant d B is the intensity of noise that is the sum of the noises generated during the transmission and the detection. We normalize the distance between Alice and Bob to be 1, and assume that Eve eavesdrops the transmitted signal at the distance D from Alice. We set the order of the attenuation caused by the distance D to be 1 D α with an arbitrary positive constant α > 0. For example, the free space with no obstacle has the constant α = 2 [30] . When we take account into the real situation, we need to choose the constant α to be greater than 2 [30] . Since the noise during the transmission increases according to the distance D, we set the order of the intensity of the noise generated during transmission to be D β with a positive constant β. Then, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , we assume that Eve receives the signal E as
where X i are random variables subject to the standard Gaussian distribution independently of each other, c E is the intensity of the noise generated during the detection, and b is chosen to be the intensity of the noise during the transmission with distance D = 1. That is, the first, second, and third terms express the original signal, the noise generated during the transmission, and the noise generated during Eve's detection. Here, we rewrite a E , Z 1 , and Under the above assumption, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , the random variable B received by Bob can be rewritten in the following way by using the random variable X 4 subject to the standard Gaussian distribution independently of X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 .
where
and c(D)X 4 describes the sum of the noises generated during the transmission between Eve and Bob and Bob's detection. That is, the first and second terms express the original signal and the noise generated during the transmission between Alice and Eve. The third term expresses the sum of the noise generated during the transmission between Eve and Bob and the noise generated during Bob's detection. Here, we rewrite Y 1 and Y 2 + Y 3 to √ bD α+β 2 X 2 and c(D)X 4 , respectively. X 4 is correlated to Y . In particular, when D = 1, the final term c(D)X 4 is the noise generated during Bob's detection, which implies c(1) = c B . Hence, from (4), the intensity c B of the noise during Bob's detection satisfies
So, we have b < d B . Under this assumption, any secure communication with forward reconciliation is impossible when the intensity c E of the noise during the Eve's detection is smaller than the intensity c B of the noise during the Bob's detection. Hence, it is important to employ the reverse reconciliation. In this problem, it is important to compare the correlation coefficient ρ E (D) between B and E and the correlation coefficient ρ A between B and X 1 , which are defined as the ratio between the covariance and the product of squares of the variances and calculated as follows.
Now, we obtain the following theorem.
Next, we consider the optimal position for Eve's detection. It is unnatural that Eve can eavesdrops at D = 0. Hence, we need to optimize it by fixing the minimum distance δ > 0 between Alice and Eve. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The equation
) holds for any
, the optimal distance D from Alice is 1 or δ. These theorems are shown in Subsection V-A III. EFFICIENT PROTOCOL TO GENERATE SECURE KEYS For a real application, Alice and Bob need to identify the parameters to identify the model. Among parameters a B , b, c E , c B , d B and α, β, δ > 0, Alice can control only the parameter a B . Firstly, dependently of the physical situation, they fix the parameters α, β > 0. Bob decides the intensity c B of the noise during his detection, which can be measured priorly. Also, Alice and Bob need to estimate the intensity c E of the noise during Eve's detection. For example, they can choose c E to be the minimum value possible current technology. Dependently of the physical situation, they need to fix the parameters α, β > 0. Then, according to the physical situation of Alice's device, Alice decides the minimum distance δ > 0 between Alice and Eve. Further, Alice and Bob decide the parameter d B by a prior communication from Alice to Bob. Then, they decide b to be d B − c B based on (5). Finally, Alice chooses the intensity that decides a B so that a B a B +d B is sufficiently larger than ρ E,max . Although there exist several methods to asymptotically attain the optimal one way key distillation rate from Gaussian random variables by using suitable discretization [31] , [35] , [36] , [37] , there is no protocol to distill secure keys from Gaussian random variables satisfying the following conditions.
(1)
The whole calculation complexity is not so large. (2) A rigorous security evaluation of the final key is available with finite block-length. Here, we propose a protocol satisfying the above conditions by a very simple idea as follows. Since the difficulty of its efficient construction is caused by the continuity, Bob applies very simple discretization, i.e., he converts his random variable to 1 or −1 by taking the sign of B, and obtains the new random variable B ′ in F 2 as (−1) B ′ = sgn B. When another Gaussian random variable X has the correlation coefficient ρ with the original Gaussian random variable B, we denote the mutual information between B ′ and X by I(ρ). In this case, we define the function φ ρ (t) as
2 dy. Here, we have
The function φ ρ (t) satisfies the following properties.
Lemma 3: (1) φ ρ (t) is monotone increasing for ρ with any t ∈ (0, 1). (2) φ ρ (t) is convex for t ∈ (0, 1). This lemma is shown in Subsection V-B.
Since the limit lim t→0 φρ(t) t equals the mutual information I(ρ), I(ρ) is also monotone increasing for ρ. The mutual information between B ′ and X 1 is I(ρ A ) and the mutual information between B ′ and E is I(ρ E (D)). They fix the rate R 1 of error correction, which is less than I(ρ A ). Then, we choose the sacrifice rate R 2 , which is larger than I(ρ E (D)). So, the key generation rate is R 1 − R 2 . Alice and Bob fix an error correcting code C ⊂ F n 2 , where n is the block-length. Bob computes the syndrome as an element [B ′ n ] of F n 2 /C from his bit sequence B ′ n , and sends it to Alice. Alice applies the error correction to recover B ′ n . Next, they apply a universal2 hash function f H to B ′ n [1], [2] that maps C to K, where H is the random variable identifying the hash function. Here, to keep the uniformity of the final key, we assume the following condition;
for any k ∈ K and any h ∈ H, where the random variable H takes values in the set H. To evaluate the leaked information, as the security measures we adopt the conditional mutual information I(K : E|H) between Bob and Eve and the variational distance measure d(K : E|H) conditioned with H as
where P K is the distribution for the final key, P E|K=k is the conditional distribution for Eve's information when the key is k, P E is the marginal distribution for Eve's information. It is known that the latter satisfies the universal composable property [8] . Further, D(P Q) is the relative entropy defined as x P (x)(log P (x) − log Q(x)) and d(P, Q) is the variational distance defined as x |P (x) − Q(x)|. From the discussions in [5] , [6] , [18] , [14] , we have
e n(t(log 2−R 2 )+φρ E,max (t)) .
The detail derivation is available in Subsection V-C. Since the function t → (log 2 − R 2 ) + φ ρ E,max (t) is convex (Lemma 3), the minimum min t∈[0, 1 2 ] t(log 2 − R 2 ) + φ ρ E,max (t) is computable by the bisection method [38, Algorithm 4.1], which gives the RHS of (13). Since s → − log s is convex, the function s → n(s(log 2 − R 2 ) + φ ρ E,max (s)) − log s is convex. So, the infimum inf t∈(0,1) t(log 2 − R 2 ) + φ ρ E,max (t) is computable in the same way. That is, we can calculate the RHS of (12). When we cannot perfectly identify α and β, it is enough to replace the constant ρ E,max by the maximum of ρ E,max with respect to α and β among the possible range of α and β.
Here, the condition for the random hash function can be relaxed to ǫ-almost universal dual hash function [7] , whose survey with non-quantum terminology is available in [18] . The latter class allows more efficient random hash functions with less random seeds [12] . Even when the random seeds H is not uniform random number, we have similar evaluations by attaching the discussion in [12] . Indeed, it is possible to apply left over hashing lemma [32] , [33] and smoothing to the min entropy [34] to our analysis. However, as is discussed in [5] , [18] , our evaluation is better than such a combination even in the asymptotic limit.
IV. EVE'S ATTACKS AND SOLUTIONS Now, we consider two possible attacks by Eve. Firstly, Eve can prepare k antennas. When Eve prepares k antennas and receives signals E j (j = 1, . . . , k), these signals can be transformed to E ′ := k j=1
1 k E j and its orthogonal components via orthogonal transformation. Since these orthogonal components are independent of B and E ′ , we can assume that Eve receives only E ′ without loss of generality. When we replace E ′ by E :=
1 k E ′ , we can apply the above analysis with replacement of c E by
. Hence, when there is a possibility that Eve prepares plural antennas, it is enough to set the constant c E to be a sufficiently small number. When Eve prepares infinitely many antennas, Alice and Bob cannot disable Eve to access their secret information. However, considering the constraint for Eve's budget, Alice and Bob can assume a reasonable value for the constant c E .
As another attack, Eve can generate an artificial noise X E known to Eve and insert the signal B received by Bob. Then, the correlation coefficient between E and B becomes larger than their expectation. However, this attack can be detected by estimating the noise between Alice and Bob as follows. When Eve inserts such an artificial noise, the intensity d of the observed noise between Alice and Bob becomes larger than the noise with the natural case. Hence, Alice and Bob apply the following procedures. (1) Alice and Bob generates several random variables via the initial transmission. (2) Alice and Bob randomly choose several check random variables among the above random variables. (3) When the observed intensity of errors is larger than the natural case, they conclude that Eve controls the signal received by Bob. So, they discard the random variables.
Rigorously, in this protocol, Alice and Bob need to authenticate each other. In this case, Alice and Bob prepare several common secret keys to authentication. However, the length of the keys for the authentication is smaller than the length of generated keys. So, this protocol well works totally.
V. PROOFS A. Proofs of Theorems 12 and 13
The derivative
We find that the derivative
2 is negative when D > 0 is close to 0. We have only two cases for the behavior of
is realized when D = δ, which implies Theorem 2. We also have
2 | D=1 is positive. In this case, the maximum of ρ E (D) 2 in [δ, 1] is realized when D = δ or D = 1, which implies Theorem 2. In particular, the maximum of
Hence, we obtain the statement of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Lemma 3
The function p → (p
] and is monotone increasing in [ , we conclude that the function ρ → (Q(x, ρ)
is monotone increasing in [0, 1] for any x. So, φ ρ (t) is monotone increasing for ρ. Now, we introduce Gallager function
which is known to be convex for t [39] . Since e φρ(t) = e E 0 (s|P B ′ |X ,P B ′ ) ((
we have φ ρ (t) = E 0 (t|P B ′ |X , P B ′ ) + t log 2, which shows that φ ρ (t) is convex for t. (12) and (13) Now, we show (12) and (13) . For this purpose, we introduce a function for a joint distribution
C. Proofs of
1−t dy, which is often denoted by −tH
Applying [5, (67) ] and [14, (21) ], we have
= 3 min
where (a) and (b) follows from [5, (67) ] and [14, (21) ], respectively. So, we obtain (13). When we replace the role of [5, (67) ] by [18, (54) and Lemma 22] , we obtain a similar evaluation as (13) for ǫ-almost universal dual hash function. Now, we introduce another function for a joint distribution P X,Y as
We 
= inf
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from [6, (3) ], [18, Lemma 5] , and [14, (21) ], respectively. So, we obtain (12). When we need evaluation with ǫ-almost universal dual hash function, it is sufficient to replace the role of [6, (3) ] by [18, (56) and Theorem 23] .
VI. DISCUSSION Under our model, as Theorem 1, we have derived a necessary and sufficient condition of the intensity a B of initial information transmission from Alice to Bob for realizing greater mutual information between Alice and Bob than that between Bob and Eve. This condition does not depend on the order parameters α and β, and is decided only from the measurable values. We have also derived rigorous and exact security evaluation for finite block-length final keys quantitatively. Since the calculation complexity of the upper bounds (12) and (13) do not depend on the block length n, this bound can be applied to any size of final keys. Further, since the calculation complexity of realization of required random hash function is only O(n log n) [12] , the proposed protocol is implementable.
Further, we have discussed two Eve's attacks in our model, increasing the number of Eve's antennas and Eve's controlling Bob's noise. Then, we have proposed the solutions for these two attacks. For an implementation of our protocol in a real secure wireless communication, we need to investigate further types of attacks.
For a realization of secure wireless communication, we need to investigate whether the obtained necessary and sufficient condition for secure communication holds with realizable communication. Since a smaller distance between Alice and Bob yields the condition, we need to derive the threshold for the distance. To clarify the threshold, we need numerical analysis based on real wireless communication model as the next step. As another future study, we need to improve our model to reflect various effects overlooked in this model and optimize Eve's strategy in the improved model because the proposed model might be too simple. Improving our model, we can enhance the quality of the security of our the secure wireless communication.
Indeed, secure wireless communication brings us an information-theoretic security only with a reasonable assumption for Eve, which is contrastive with quantum key distribution that provides unconditional security. Improving our model, we can clarify the assumption for Eve, Such a clarification promotes the introduction of secure wireless communication because the customers can understand what kind of eavesdropper cannot eavesdrop their communication. Since the intended purpose of secure wireless communication is different from that of quantum key distribution, secure wireless communication might be used in the mobile phone of ordinary people.
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